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Abstract 
Although Bohr’s Correspondence Principle (CP) played a central role in the first versions of 
quantum mechanics, its original version seems to have no present-day relevance. The purpose 
of the present article is to show that the CP, with no need of being interpreted in terms of the 
quantum-to-classical limit, still plays a relevant role in the understanding of the relationships 
between the classical and the quantum domains. In particular, it will be argued that a generic 
version of the CP is very helpful for elucidating the physical meaning of the phenomenon of 
quantum decoherence.  
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1.- Introduction 
Although historians and philosophers of physics agree on that Niels Bohr’s Correspondence 
Principle (CP) played a central role in the first versions of quantum mechanics, in general 
they do not reach a consensus about the interpretation of the principle. Nevertheless, 
independently of this disagreement, a good question is what relevance the principle may have 
at present, since it was formulated in the context of the “old quantum theory,” already set 
aside in the present-day practice of physics. Perhaps precisely for this reason most physicists 
rapidly forgot the original presentation of the CP, and the principle turned out to be conceived 
as the general requirement that quantum mechanics approximate the results of classical 
mechanics in the appropriate limit. As a consequence, the CP in its Bohr’s original version 
became only interesting for the historians of quantum mechanics. 
The purpose of the present article is to recover Bohr’s original version of the CP as a 
useful theoretical tool to face conceptual problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics. 
From this perspective, we will show that the CP, with no need of being interpreted in terms of 
a quantum-to-classical limit, still plays a relevant role in the understanding of the 
relationships between the classical and the quantum domains. In particular, it will be argued 
that a generalized version of the original CP is very helpful for elucidating the physical 
meaning of the phenomenon of quantum decoherence. For this purpose, in Section 2, the 
origins of the CP in the old quantum theory will be recalled, stressing how a claim about the 
relationship between frequencies and motions in the model of the atom gradually became a 
requirement about the classical limit of quantum mechanics. Section 3 will deal with Robert 
Batterman’s proposal of appealing to the CP, in its original formulation, as a conceptual tool 
to face the hard problem of defining quantum chaos. Batterman’s strategy will lead us in the 
way toward the elucidation of the concept of decoherence. In order to follow this way, first 
the theoretical foundations of quantum decoherence will be summarized in Section 4, 
stressing the issue of the interpretation of the reduced state in terms of what Bernard 
d’Espagnat called “improper mixture”. Section 5 will be devoted to elucidate the nature of the 
reduced state by establishing the analogy between the classical and the quantum cases. Such 
an analogy, manifested as a structural correspondence at the level of expectation values, 
shows that quantum reduced states are coarse descriptions, analogously to coarse-grained 
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states and to reduced states in classical statistical mechanics. This result will be the basis, in 
Section 6, to generalize the CP as the correspondence between analogous quantum and 
classical concepts and regularities, and to conceive the structural correspondence presented in 
the previous section as a particular case of this generalized CP. Thus, following Batterman’s 
strategy regarding using the CP as a tool to face conceptual difficulties in quantum mechanics, 
it can be concluded that, since quantum reduced states are coarse descriptions, then 
decoherence is a coarse phenomenon, relative to the relevant observables considered for the 
description. Finally, in the last section, after summarizing the main results of the article, the 
conceptual lines opened by this way of conceiving decoherence will be pointed out, in 
particular those related to the classical limit of quantum mechanics and to quantum chaos. 
2.- From the correspondence principle to the classical limit 
As Alisa Bokulich (2014) points out, the CP was not only an essential assumption that marked 
the birth of quantum mechanics, but also the cornerstone of Bohr’s interpretation of the 
theory, strongly linked to his view of complementarity. In a nutshell, the principle establishes 
a correspondence between radiation and motion: the energy spectrum of an atom, with the 
possible transitions between stationary states, is connected with the periodic motions of the 
electrons in the atom. 
Although in Bohr’s 1913 lecture “On the constitution of molecules and atoms” the idea 
of correspondence is preannounced, it is in the 1918 article “On the quantum theory of line 
spectra” that Bohr explicitly talks about “the analogy between the quantum theory and the 
ordinary theory of radiation” (Bohr 1918: 70). The terms ‘correspondence’ and 
‘correspondence principle’ appear for the first time in a lecture of 1920, in which Bohr 
explains that, despite the difference between ordinary electrodynamics and the new theory,  
“there is found, nevertheless, to exist a far-reaching correspondence between the 
various types of possible transitions between the stationary states on the one hand 
and the various harmonic components of the motion on the other hand.” (Bohr 
1920, in Bohr 1976: 245-246). 
As Robert Batterman (1991) stresses, in these first works, the CP does not amount to a claim 
to the effect that the quantum theory must contain the classical theory as a limiting case. By 
contrast, Bohr claims that 
“[t]his application of the Correspondence Principle [...] on the whole expresses 
clearly the close connection between radiation and motion in the quantum theory, 
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which persists in spite of the fundamental difference between the character of the 
postulates and the continuous description of the classical theory.” (Bohr 1924: 26) 
In other words, Bohr does not conceive the CP as stating the agreement between the classical 
and the quantum descriptions in a limiting domain, but rather, as a substantive claim: “this 
Correspondence Principle must be regarded purely as a law of the quantum theory” (Bohr 
1924: 22). Thus, in Bohr’s version, the CP is first formulated as a contingent claim derived 
from experimental facts, but then it is promoted to the status of a principle, that is, of a law of 
the theory, endowed with physical necessity. 
Some contemporary physicists embraced Bohr’s CP and even developed it further. This 
is the case of Hendrik Kramers in his 1919 doctoral dissertation under Bohr supervision, and 
of John van Vleck in a 1924 article, which bears the subtitle “Some extensions of the 
correspondence principle.” Nevertheless, and despite Bohr’s high reputation, several 
contemporary authors manifested their dissatisfaction regarding the CP: if quantum 
mechanics is a fundamental theory, in principle universally applicable, it is difficult to 
understand why merely “phenomenological” classical facts play a relevant role in the 
understanding of the quantum domain. This was the view of Arnold Sommerfeld, who 
considered the CP “a magic wand […], which allows us immediately to make use of the 
results of the classical wave theory in the quantum theory.” (Sommereld 1923: 275). 
Sommerfeld’s dislike of CP seems to be the result of what he considered an illegitimate 
mixing of quantum and classical concepts: “I cannot view it [the CP] as ultimately satisfying 
on account of its mixing of quantum-theoretical and classical viewpoints. (Sommerfeld 1924: 
1048). 
Perhaps due to the influence from Sommerfeld, who was the supervisor of his doctoral 
dissertation, Wolfgang Pauli was also very skeptical about the relevance of the CP. In fact, he 
outrightly rejected Bohr’s suggestion of grounding the exclusion principle on CP:  
“I personally do not believe, however, that the correspondence principle will lead 
to a foundation of the rule […].The justification of the exclusion […] in the H-
atom by pointing to the collision with the nucleus has never pleased me much. It 
would be much more satisfying if we could understand directly on the grounds of 
a more general quantum mechanics (one that deviates from classical mechanics).” 
(Pauli to Bohr, December 31st, 1924, quoted in Heilbron 1983: 306) 
This dissatisfaction with the CP seems to contrast with the fact that, in his doctoral 
dissertation, Pauli (1922) had introduced what he had called a “mechanical correspondence 
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principle”, in analogy with the original electrodynamical CP as proposed by Bohr. Pauli’s 
idea was that classical mechanics should break down when applied to inelastic collision 
processes because the amount of energy transferred in the process cannot be continuous. 
However, the seed of a reinterpretation of the CP can be found already in this idea, since 
Pauli’s initial assumption was the requirement that the results of quantum theory and classical 
mechanics coincide in the case of large quantum numbers, where the energy states converge 
toward a continuum. As Robert Rynasiewicz points out, the advance toward a reinterpretation 
of the CP was perceived by some contemporary physicists, who complained that “Pauli did 
not establish a correspondence, in Bohr’s sense of the word” (Rynasiewicz 2015: 184).  
Pauli’s treatment of the CP was the first step toward a new reading of the principle in 
terms of the classical limit of quantum mechanics. In fact, just a few years after Pauli’s 
dissertation, Paul Dirac characterized the CP as the requirement that “the classical theory 
gives the right results in the limiting case when the action per cycle of the system is large 
compared to Planck’s constant h, and in certain other special cases.” (Dirac 1925: 642). Since 
then, the CP began to be conceived as a limiting requirement, and under this reading appeared 
in the most used textbooks of quantum mechanics. For instance, in Max Born’s classic book, 
the CP is introduced with the following words: 
“The leading idea (Bohr’s correspondence principle, 1923) may be stated broadly 
as follows. Judged by the test of experience, the laws of classical physics have 
brilliantly justified themselves in all processes of motion […] it must be 
demanded that, for the limiting cases of large masses and of orbits of large 
dimensions, the new mechanics passes over into classical mechanics.” (Born 
1933: 103) 
The CP is introduced in David Bohm’s well-known textbook in a similar way: 
“[T]he correspondence principle […] states that the laws of quantum physics must 
be so chosen that in the classical limit, where many quanta are involved, the 
quantum laws lead to the classical equations as an average” (Bohm 1951: 31) 
Summing up, from being a principle that establishes a correspondence between 
radiation and motion in Bohr’s writings, the CP gradually became the general requirement 
that quantum mechanics be able to recover the empirical success of classical mechanics in the 
limit of large masses and orbits of large dimensions. It may seem that the classical limit 
requirement is the only version of the CP that makes sense to survive in the standard version 
of quantum mechanics, once the old quantum theory has been set aside in the current practice 
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of physics. However, here we will focus on Bohr’s original “correspondence” version, in 
order to show that it can still be useful for the conceptual understanding of certain aspects of 
the theory. 
3.- Correspondence principle and quantum chaos 
Rynasiewicz (2015) explicitly points out the tension “constraint versus postulate” regarding 
the interpretation of the CP, that is, the tension between viewing the CP as a heuristic 
principle for theory construction and conceiving it as a law of quantum mechanics. Perhaps 
the two views are not incompatible: even if for Bohr himself the CP was a fundamental law of 
quantum mechanics, retrospectively it may be interpreted as a leading heuristic factor in the 
construction of the theory. Anyway, at present the CP seems to be superfluous from the two 
viewpoints: it is clearly not a part of the new formalism, nor is it necessary to construct a 
theory that is already complete. Despite this unfavorable opinion regarding the present-day 
relevance of the CP, here it will be shown that the principle can still play an interesting role in 
the understanding of the relationship between the quantum and the classical domains. Let us 
see this in the case of quantum chaos. 
Although the existence of chaos in classical mechanics has been rigorously proved only 
in a few highly idealized systems, the behavior of many classical systems exhibits features 
that can be easily interpreted as results emerging from a chaotic dynamics. These empirical 
manifestations contrast with the fact that chaos in quantum systems seems to be the exception 
rather than the rule. The relative scarcity of quantum chaos has been repeatedly conceived as 
a challenge for the CP: “some have used the quantum chaos problem to cast doubt on the 
correspondence principle and, as a result, on the empirical adequacy of quantum mechanics” 
(Kronz 1998: 51). For instance, Belot and Earman talk about the “widely shared sense that 
chaos presents a challenge either to quantum mechanics itself or to our understanding of the 
correspondence principle” (Belot and Earman 1997: 149). 
At least two general strategies have been adopted to stress the pressure that chaos seems 
to put on the CP. The first one is a top-down strategy, which relies on quantizing simple 
classical chaotic models: the problem is that the resulting quantum models are usually non-
chaotic according to some feature considered as an indicator of chaos. This is the 
argumentative path followed by Joseph Ford and his colleagues (Ford, Mantica, and Ristow 
1991, Ford and Mantica 1992): by taking the notion of complexity as the key concept for 
defining chaos, they argue that the systems resulting from the quantization of classical chaotic 
systems have null complexity and, therefore, are intrinsically non-chaotic. On this basis, the 
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authors conclude that the CP has been refuted and that quantum mechanics should be replaced 
with a theory capable of accounting for chaotic behavior. 
The second general strategy consists in searching for the usual indicators of chaos 
directly in quantum systems and verifying that those indicators are absent in quantum 
evolutions. The particular arguments differ from each other with respect to the specific feature 
to be regarded as the relevant indicator of chaotic behavior. For instance, when the 
exponential divergence of trajectories is focused, the usual claim is that quantum mechanics 
suppresses chaos because it is not possible to define precise trajectories in quantum evolutions 
(see, e.g., Schuster 1984). Since non-linearity is usually taken as a necessary condition for 
chaos in classical systems, some researchers have concluded that quantum systems are 
unavoidably non-chaotic because the Schrödinger equation is linear (Berry 1989). Another 
feature that has been used to explain the scarcity of quantum chaos is the unitarity of the 
Schrödinger evolutions: due to the fact that quantum evolutions change neither the angle nor 
the distance between vectors corresponding to different states, quantum systems are not 
sensitive to initial conditions and, therefore, they are non-chaotic (see discussion in Kronz 
1998). 
Independently of how the CP is conceived, the different views about the tension 
between chaos and quantum mechanics disagree on which the correct or, at least, the best 
indicator of quantum chaos is. This disagreement points to a problem that is conceptually 
previous to the supposed tension: what ‘chaos at the quantum level’ means. Since the concept 
of chaos still lacks a precise and completely general definition in the classical domain (for a 
detailed conceptual discussion, see Batterman 1993; for the difference among mathematical 
definitions, see Smith 1998: Chapter 10), drawing fatal conclusions from a supposed scarcity 
of quantum chaos seems to be a too extreme maneuver. Perhaps for this reason Batterman 
turns the problem upside down: the issue is not to understand why there is no chaos in the 
quantum domain, but rather to understand what quantum chaos means. And in the search for a 
definition of quantum chaos, the CP plays a guiding role:  
“(2) the CP can be maintained and, in fact, used to further investigate the 
connections between classical motions and quantum properties and processes. If 
(2) holds, then it may be quite reasonable to think that the CP can serve as a guide 
or signpost to finding a proper definition of quantum chaos.” (Batterman 1991: 
215) 
 8 
But, as remarked in the previous section, Batterman stresses that Bohr does not understand the 
CP as simply expressing that the two theories must agree in a limiting domain. By contrast, 
the CP is a substantive claim that expresses an intimate connection between periodic classical 
motion and the stationary states of quantum systems.  
Batterman’s strategy consists in extending the method that he calls ‘torus quantisation’ 
(following Berry 1983) to the case of systems whose classical counterparts may exhibit chaos. 
Torus quantization, strictly valid in the integrable case, shows that the classical periodic orbits 
can be used to yield the quantum energy spectrum. Batterman finds the modern expression of 
the CP in the extension of the correspondence between periodic motion and energy spectrum 
to the ergodic case. On the basis of this reading, “the CP […] makes plausible a definition of 
quantum chaos in terms of the statistics of spectra.” (Batterman 1991: 221). As a 
consequence, Batterman concludes that “once the CP is properly interpreted, it is not 
threatened by the fact that QM does not appear to exhibit chaotic behavior of the kind present 
in CM. In fact, […] the CP actually does help settle the definitional debate.” (Batterman 1991: 
191). 
In the present context the interest is focused not on the technical details of Batterman’s 
proposal, but rather on his general strategy: given a conceptual problem in the quantum 
domain, in particular regarding its relationship with the classical world, the CP is appealed 
to as a guiding principle that provides the framework for a satisfactory solution. The plan is 
to apply the same strategy to face certain conceptual problems related to the interpretation of 
quantum decoherence. For this purpose, the theoretical foundations of decoherence and 
certain conceptual difficulties of the decoherence program will be first recalled. 
4.- Environment-induced decoherence 
The roots of the environment-induced decoherence program can be found in certain works of 
the seventies, in which the measurement problem began to be addressed from an open-system 
perspective: the point was that macroscopic systems, such as measurement apparatuses, are 
never perfectly closed, but interact significantly with their environments (see Zeh 1970, 
1973). On the basis of those pioneers works, the theory of decoherence was systematized and 
developed by Wojciech Zurek (1981, 1982, 1991, 2003) and his collaborators, by conceiving 
decoherence as a process resulting from the interaction between a quantum system and its 
environment. Let us recall the basics of this environment-induced decoherence approach, at 
present the orthodox approach to quantum decoherence. 
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Given an open quantum system S in the state i i ic   and its environment E , the 
initial state of the whole system SE  can be expressed as 
0(0) i i
i
c                         (1) 
where 0  is the state of the environment before its interaction with S . The initial state 
(0)  evolves into ( ) t , such that the density operator ρˆ( ) ( ) ( )  t t t  results  
*ρˆ( ) ( ) ( )i j i i j j
ij
t c c t t                      (2) 
where the ( )i t  are the states of the environment associated with the different states i , 
and the * 0i jc c  , with i j , represent the quantum correlations that preclude classicality. The 
orthodox approach relies on computing the reduced density operator ρˆ ( )Sr t  of the open system 
S, which results from tracing over the environmental degrees of freedom: 
*ˆ ˆρ ( ) ρ( ) ( ) ( )Sr E i j i j i j
ij
t Tr t c c t t                   (3) 
where the factor ( ) ( )i jt t  , with i j , determines the size of the off-diagonal terms at 
each time. Many standard models for the interaction Hamiltonian show that, for environments 
with a very large number of degrees of freedom, the states i  rapidly approach 
orthogonality, ( ) ( )i j ijt t    . As a consequence, after an extremely short “decoherence 
time”, the reduced state of the open system becomes diagonal in a “pointer basis”  i  
corresponding to the classically behaving observable: 
2
ˆ ˆρ ( ) ρS Sr r i i i
i
t c                      (4) 
According to the orthodox interpretation of decoherence, the decohered state ρˆSr  is the 
quantum state of the open system S  and represents a quantum mixture that contains only the 
terms corresponding to classical correlations. It is precisely for this reason that decoherence 
would offer the essential ingredient for solving the quantum measurement problem and for 
explaining the quantum-to-classical transition. In particular, Zurek conceives the process of 
decoherence as the dynamical description of the phenomenon of collapse (see Zurek 1981), 
since “quantum entanglement will be converted into an effectively classical correlation as a 
result of the interaction” (Paz and Zurek 2002: 90). As a consequence, decoherence would 
supply the explanation of the emergence of classicality: “the environment distills the classical 
essence of a quantum system.” (Zurek 2003: 3).  
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This way of conceiving the physical phenomenon led Zurek and his collaborators to 
claim that decoherence produces the “degradation” of pure states into mixtures:  
“When the system is open, interaction with the environment will inevitably result 
in an incessant “monitoring” of some of the observables by the environmental 
degrees of freedom. This will result in the degradation of the pure states into 
mixtures.” (Paz and Zurek 2002: 14) 
“pure states turn into mixtures and rapidly diagonalize in the einselected states” 
(Zurek 2003: 13) 
In order to quantify such a “degradation”, the evolution of the purity   of the open system is 
studied, as defined as (see Zurek 2003: 18):  
 
2
ˆ( ) ρ ( )Srt Tr t                         (5) 
According to Zurek, this quantity is equal to one for a pure state and decreases when the state 
becomes mixed. 
However, Bernard d’Espagnat (1976) warned against the interpretation of reduced states 
as quantum states by introducing the already classical distinction between proper and 
improper mixtures: whereas a proper mixture is the quantum state of a closed system, an 
improper mixture is a density operator obtained by disregarding some degrees of freedom of 
the closed system. If only the retained degrees of freedom are considered, the resulting 
improper mixture cannot be distinguished from the analogous proper mixture. But, as 
d’Espagnat stresses (1995), there is no theoretical reason that prevents from having access to, 
at least, some of the traced over degrees of freedom: this access would show that the proper 
mixture and the improper mixture are, in principle, testably different. In the context of 
decoherence, the difference is also pointed out by Heinz-Dieter Zeh, one of the founding 
fathers of the decoherence theory: “The conceptually important difference between true and 
apparent ensembles was clearly pointed out by Bernard d’Espagnat (1976) when he 
distinguished between proper and improper mixtures […] this difference can even be 
observed as recoherence (a relocalization of the superposition, that would be impossible for a 
proper mixture).” (Zeh 2005: 2). 
It is interesting to notice that the discussion about the conceptual difference between 
proper and improper mixtures makes sense because both are represented by the same kind of 
mathematical object a density operator. However, this feature essentially depends on the 
Hilbert space formalism used to articulate the theory; but the situation is different in other 
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formalisms. For instance, proper and improper mixtures are represented by different kinds of 
density operators in the quaternionic formulation of quantum mechanics (Masillo, Scolarici, 
and Sozzo 2009, see also Adler 1995); therefore, in this formal framework they can be 
distinguished not only physically but also mathematically. 
On the basis of the above considerations it is quite clear that the reduced state of an 
open system cannot be strictly considered its quantum state. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
to deprive the reduced state of any meaning, since it does supply a certain description of the 
open system. The correspondence between the quantum and the classical domains will offer 
conceptual elements to elucidate the nature of the reduced state and, with this, to clarify how 
decoherence should be interpreted.  
5.- Analogy and correspondence between classical and quantum domains 
The content of this section will be devoted to show that a general concept of coarse 
description can be defined such that, both in the classical and in the quantum cases, coarse 
descriptions result from two related but different operations: coarse-graining and partial trace. 
The analogy between the classical case and the quantum case will supply the basis to offer, in 
the next section, a meaningful version of the CP and, in turn, to understand the physical 
meaning of decoherence. 
5.1.- Coarse-graining 
In Gibbsian statistical mechanics, the system under study is represented by an ensemble of 
abstract systems in different microstates that are compatible with the system’s macrostate. 
The statistical state of the system is represented by a density function ( , )r t  normalized to 
unity, defined on a phase space  , where r  represents a possible microstate (position 
and momentum). In turn, the physical magnitudes depending on the microstates r are 
represented by observables ( )O r , such that :O  . The density function ( , )r t  allows 
computing the phase average (average on all the members of the ensemble) of any observable 
( )O r  as 
( , )
( ) ( , ) ( )
r t
O r r t O r dr
 
                    (6) 
In this Gibbsian approach, statistical equilibrium is defined as the situation in which the phase 
averages are independent of time; this situation is represented by the microcanonical 
ensemble, whose corresponding density distribution is uniform over all the accessible region 
of the phase space. 
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One of the central problems in this theoretical context is how to explain the approach to 
equilibrium by means of the reversible time-evolution of the density function. In fact, the 
evolution of ( , )r t  is ruled by the Liouville equation and, as a consequence, has no limit for 
t  : as proved by the Liouville theorem, the volume of the support of ( , )r t  in   is time-
invariant. Therefore, the problem of irreversibility in classical statistical mechanics turns out 
to be how to account for an irreversible approach to equilibrium in systems ruled by an 
underlying time-invariant evolution law (see Frigg 2007). The standard answer in the context 
of the Gibbsian approach relies on coarse graining: the phase space   is partitioned into cells 
iC  of the same volume ( )iC  in  , and a coarse-grained distribution ( )cg r  is defined such 
that 
 
 
1
2
1 1
2 2
1/ ( ) ( ) if 
( ) 1/ ( ) ( ) if 
C
cg
C
C r dr r C
r C r dr r C
   


    




               (7) 
Since the coarse-grained state cg  is not the original statistical state, it is not ruled by the 
dynamical law of classical statistical mechanics and, as a consequence, its evolution is not 
constrained by the Liouville theorem: ( , )cg r t  may approach a definite limit for t  . This 
is what effectively happens when the system has a sufficiently high degree of instability: it 
can be proved that, if the system is mixing, the coarse-grained state approaches a time-
independent equilibrium state, ( )( , ) ( )cg cg eqr t r   (see, e.g., Berkovitz, Frigg, and Kronz 
2006). 
The expectation values of the observables of the system can be computed in the coarse-
grained state ( )cg r  analogously to eq. (6): 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
cg
cgr
O r r O r dr
 
                     (8) 
It is quite clear that the same result can be obtained if certain “gross observables” are defined 
as follows: 
 
 
1
2
1 1
2 2
1/ ( ) ( ) if 
( ) 1/ ( ) ( ) if 
C
cg
C
C O r dr r C
O r C O r dr r C
  


  




               (9) 
In fact,  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
 

cg
cgr r
O r O r                     (10) 
In quantum mechanics a similar strategy can be developed. Let us consider a closed 
system whose Hilbert space  is spanned by the eigenstates r  of an observable R of 
continuous spectrum; so, any state ˆ  and any observable Oˆ  can be expressed, respectively, as 
ˆ ( , ') ' 'r r r r drdr                       (11) 
ˆ ( , ') ' 'O O r r r r drdr                      (12) 
In this case, coarse graining is the result of partitioning the space   into regions 
corresponding to ( , ) ir r C  . On the basis of this partition, coarse-grained states and coarse-
grained observables can be defined as follows. First, certain coarse-grained functions that 
average the components of states and observables in the regions iC  are defined: 
( , ') ( , ) if ( , )
i
cg i
C
r r r r r r drdr r r C                   (13) 
( , ') ( , ) if ( , )
i
cg i
C
O r r O r r r r drdr r r C                (14) 
Second, the corresponding operators are obtained as 
ˆ ( , ') ' 'cg cg r r r r drdr                     (15) 
ˆ ( , ') ' 'cg cgO O r r r r drdr                    (16) 
This leads to a situation completely analogous to the classical case: the coarse-grained 
description can be obtained both by averaging the fine-grained observables in the coarse-
grained state or by averaging the coarse-grained observables in the fine-grained state (see eq. 
(10): 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
cg
cgO O
 
                        (17) 
This quantum coarse-graining procedure was the strategy followed in certain early 
attempts to explain the emergence of classicality during a period that can be considered as the 
pre-history of the decoherence program. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the issue was 
treated in the context of the study of irreversibility in closed systems (van Kampen 1954, van 
Hove 1957, 1959, Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi 1962). From this perspective, the states that 
are indistinguishable from the viewpoint of certain “gross” observables are described by the 
same coarse-grained state, whose evolution can be proved to reach equilibrium in a certain 
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relaxation time. The main problem of this period was that the relaxation times so obtained 
turned out to be too long to account for the experimental emergence of classical behavior (see 
Omnès 2005). 
Summing up, although coarse graining is a traditional procedure to explain 
irreversibility in classical statistical mechanics, it can be appealed to when the issue is 
quantum irreversibility; see Table 1 for the analogy between the two cases (Fortin and 
Lombardi 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.- Partial trace 
Although the reduced state of an open system can be computed by tracing over the degrees of 
freedom of its environment, the very definition of the concept of reduced state does not appeal 
to partial trace. The reduced state ρˆSr  of the open system S  is defined as the density operator 
by means of which the expectation values of all the observables of S  can be computed. 
Precisely, if S  and E  are the Hilbert spaces of the open system S  and its environment E  
respectively,  S E  is the Hilbert space of the closed system SE , 
ˆ  S S SO  is an 
observable of S , ˆEI  is the identity in E E , and ρˆ   is the state of SE , then the 
reduced state of S  is defined as the density operator ρˆSr  such that 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
 

S
r
SE
S SO O                        (18) 
Table 1: Coarse graining in classical statistical mechanics and in 
quantum mechanics. 
; ( ) ; ( )r r O r   
CSM QM 
ˆˆ with ; ;R r O  
cg
cgO O 
  
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
cg
cgO O
 
  
Coarse graining in variable r 
1
( ) ( ) if 
( ) i
cg i
C
i
r r dr r C
C

   

  
 
1
( ) ( ) if 
( ) i
cg i
C
i
O r O r dr r C
C

 

  
Coarse graining in variable r 
( , ) ( , ) if ( , )
i
cg i
C
r r r r drdr r r C      
 
ˆ ( , )cg cg r r r r drdr      
( , ) ( , ) if ( , )
i
cg i
C
O r r O r r drdr r r C    
 
ˆ ( , )cg cgO O r r r r drdr     
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where ˆ ˆ ˆSES S EO O I  . On the basis of this definition, the reduced state can be computed by 
tracing over the degrees of freedom of E , as ˆ ˆρ ρSr ETr .  
In the quantum domain, the operation of partial-trace was used not only in the account 
of the phenomenon of decoherence. It was already implicit in what Erwin Schrödinger (1926) 
called “density of electricity” or “electric charge density”, a quantity defined in the space of 
three dimensions, which he considered the quantum magnitude with direct physical meaning 
(see Przibram 1967).  
In classical statistical mechanics an analogous strategy can be developed. Let us 
consider a closed system SE of N particles described by a phase space   of 6N dimensions. 
The states and observables of the system are functions of the 3N positions iq  and the 3N 
momenta ip  of the N particles: 
1 1 3 3( ) ( , ,..., , )N Nr q p q p                      (19) 
1 1 3 3( ) ( , ,..., , )N NO r O q p q p                    (20) 
If the purpose is to describe an open subsystem S of s particles, the interest is centered on the 
observables 
1 1 3 3( , ,..., , )S s sO q p q p . In order to compute the expectation values of these 
observables, a reduced state ( )Sr r  can be computed by means of a partial trace:  
1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 3 3( , ,..., , ) ... ( , ,..., , ) ...
S
r s s N N s s N Nq p q p q p q p dq dp dq dp          (21) 
The reduced state 
1 1 3 3( , ,..., , )
S
r s sq p q p  of the subsystem S of s particles disregards the degrees 
of freedom of the environment E composed by the remaining N s  particles. In turn, the 
observable of the open system S can be expressed from the viewpoint of the closed system of 
N particles as a function on the phase space  : 
1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3( , ,..., , ) ( , ,..., , )
SE
S s s S N NO q p q p O q p q p              (22) 
The reduced state 
1 1 3 3( , ,..., , )
S
r s sq p q p  can also be expressed from the viewpoint of the closed 
system as a function on  : 
1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3( , ,..., , ) ( , ,..., , )
S SE
r s s S N Nq p q p q p q p                 (23) 
Therefore, the expectation values of the observables of S can be computed alternatively from 
the perspective of the closed system SE of N particles or from the perspective of the open 
subsystem S of s particles (see the analogy with the quantum case given by eq. (18)): 
 
S
r
SE
S SO O                        (24) 
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In this classical statistical context, reduced densities are used to compute the expectation 
values of the observables (phase functions) that depend on the dynamical variables of a subset 
of the particles of the system, such as, for instance, the kinetic energy of a single particle, or 
the potential energy of two particles. The evolution of the reduced densities is described by 
the set of equations known as BBGKY hierarchy due to the name of its authors: Nicolái 
Bogoliubov (1946), Max Born and Herbert Green (1946), John Kirkwood (1946), and Jacques 
Yvon (1935). 
Summing up, although partial trace is a traditional procedure to account for the behavior 
of open systems in quantum mechanics, it is also used in classical statistical mechanics when 
the interest is focused on certain particular magnitudes; see Table 2 for the analogy between 
the two cases (Fortin and Lombardi 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.- Coarse descriptions 
As explained in Subsection 5.1, coarse-grained descriptions result from a partition of the 
space of states into discrete and disjoint cells iC : this operation defines the coarse-grained 
distribution. Since applying the same coarse-graining operation to the coarse-grained 
distribution does not modify the result, the relationship between the coarse-grained and the 
fine-grained descriptions can be described in terms of projection: 
classical: cg cg cg       cg                  (25) 
quantum: cg cg cgˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ       cg                  (26) 
System :  (  particles) ; ;SE N O   ˆˆSystem : ; ;SE O   
CSM 
Table 2: Partial trace in classical statistical mechanics and in 
quantum mechanics. 
QM 
S
r
SE
S SO O 
  
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
S
r
SE
S SO O
 
  
Subsystem S (s particles) 
1 1 3 3( , ,..., , )S s sO q p q p  
 
1 1 3 3( , ,..., , )
SE
S N NO q p q p  
 
3 1 3 1 3 3... ...
S
r s s N Ndq dp dq dp      
Subsystem S (open system) 
ˆ
S S SO    
 
ˆ ˆ ˆSE
S S EO O I   
 
ˆ ˆS
r ETr    
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where the projectors cg  and cgˆ  perform the operations described by eq. (7) and eq. (15), 
respectively (strictly speaking, in the Hilbert-space formalism of Koopman (1931) in the 
classical case). 
On the other hand, as explained above, the reduced state of an open system S  in 
interaction with its environment E  is defined as the state by means of which the expectation 
values of all the observables of S  can be computed. But, in this case, the state of the closed 
composite system SE  and the reduced state of S  belong to different mathematical spaces. 
Therefore, for dimensional reasons the reduced state of S  cannot be directly expressed as the 
result of a projection onto the state of SE . Nevertheless, a coarse description from the 
viewpoint of the closed composite system can be defined in the following way (the 
explanation corresponds to the quantum case, but it is completely analogous for the classical 
case in the formalism of Koopman). The expectation value of ˆSO  in the reduced state ˆ
S
r , 
originally computed as in eq. (18), can also be expressed as the expectation value of the 
observables ˆ ˆ ˆSES S EO O I   of the closed system SE in a state ˆ
SE
r   : 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
S SE SE
r r r
SE
S S S EO O O I
  
                    (27) 
The density operator ˆ SEr  can be obtained as 
pt pt ptˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ       SEr                      (28) 
where the projector ptˆ  performs the following operation: 
 ptˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ       
ES
EE rTr                   (29) 
and 
E
E E    is a normalized identity operator with coefficients /
E
  
     (see 
Fortin and Lombardi 2014). In turn, if we trace off the degrees of freedom of the environment 
E on ˆ SEr , we recover the reduced state of the open system S: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆρ ρESE S SE r E r rTr Tr                       (30) 
This means that the ˆ SEr , which “erases” the components of the quantum state ρˆ  
corresponding to the environment E, supplies the same information about the open system S 
as the reduced state ρˆSr , but now from the viewpoint of the closed system SE. Therefore, the 
relationship between the traced and the non-traced description can also be described in terms 
of projection: 
classical: 
pt pt pt       SEr    
              (31) 
quantum: 
pt pt ptˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ       SEr                  (32) 
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Summing up, both in the case of coarse graining and in the case of partial trace, a state 
that supplies a coarse description of the closed system can be defined, in such a way that it 
can be obtained as a projection onto the “fine description”. The difference between the two 
cases lies in what is disregarded in each one of them. As clearly explained by Michael 
Mackey (1989), coarse graining implies the loss of some information about the exact values of 
all the dynamical variables, whereas partial trace implies the loss of all the information about 
the exact value of some dynamical variables. 
Table 1 and Table 2, as well as the two pairs of equations (25)-(26) and (31)-(32) show 
relevant analogies between the classical and the quantum domains concerning expectation 
values. These analogies can be regarded as a case of what Stephan Hartmann (2008) calls 
‘structure correspondence’, in his systematization of the different types of correspondence 
relations. In the next section we will show how this structure correspondence can be 
conceived as a particular case of a generalized version of the correspondence principle. 
6.- Correspondence and the physical meaning of decoherence 
6.1.- Generalizing the Correspondence Principle 
Although the original CP was designed to establish a link between frequencies and motions, 
the idea was broadened already in Bohr’s times. In fact, in his doctoral dissertation under 
Sommerfeld’s supervision, Pauli (1922) introduced what he called a “mechanical” CP: since 
classical mechanics applied to inelastic collision processes should also break down because of 
energy quantization, a CP for this case, in analogy with Bohr’s electrodynamical principle, 
was necessary.  
Of course, in Pauli’s extrapolation to the mechanical domain, the CP has not exactly the 
original meaning devised by Bohr. Nevertheless, the “mechanical CP” still retains the idea of 
a certain correspondence between quantum and classical. This extrapolation suggests the 
possibility of formulating a generalized version of the CP, concerned with the 
correspondence between analogous quantum and classical concepts and regularities. In the 
light of this proposal, the structural correspondence between the classical and the quantum 
domains concerning expectation values, as described in Section 5, turns out to be a particular 
case of that generalized version of Bohr’s CP. On this basis, two remarks are in order. 
First, it is worth emphasizing again that the structural correspondence appears at the 
level of the expectation values. In the early days of the environment-induced program, and 
following the works of other authors (e.g., Ballentine, Yang, and Zibin 1994), some 
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decoherence theorists conceived the CP as the demand for the agreement between quantum 
and classical expectation values (see, e.g., Habib, Shizume, and Zurek 1998), and claimed that 
decoherence is the physical process that leads to such an agreement. But this expectation-
value perspective got lost in later works, in which the phenomenon of decoherence came to be 
seen as the result of the dynamical evolution of the open system’s reduced state. In the light of 
the structure correspondence exhibited in the previous section, here we will come back to the 
perspective based on expectation values in order to understand decoherence. 
Second, and related with the previous remark: from the perspective opened by structure 
correspondence, this particular case of the generalized CP becomes an expectation-value 
requirement, that is, the demand for the agreement between classical and quantum expectation 
values. This is the view adopted by Belot and Earman when, in their article about the CP in 
the context of the problem of quantum chaos, they require “that the quantum expectation 
values mimic classical expectation values computed from the appropriate  .” (1997: 169). It 
is precisely in this point that quantum decoherence plays a substantial role: the agreement 
required by the CP is reached only when decoherence occurs. In other words, decoherence is 
the phenomenon that allows the CP, in its expectation-value version, to be fulfilled. And, in 
turn, as will be argued below, this version of the CP offers the conceptual elements to 
understand the physical meaning of decoherence. 
6.2.- Using the Correspondence Principle as a conceptual tool 
At this point we have all the elements to follow Batterman’s strategy: appealing to the CP as a 
guiding principle to face conceptual problems related with the relation between classical and 
quantum. In particular, the CP as a conceptual tool will help us to elucidate the nature of the 
reduced state and, with it, the physical meaning of the phenomenon of decoherence. 
In the classical case, the diverse ways of conceiving the coarse-grained state express the 
different interpretations of irreversibility, in the context of a debate that is still as alive as in 
the birth of statistical mechanics (see, e.g. Frigg 2007). Nevertheless, despite the debates 
about interpretation, nobody ignores the difference between the statistical state, which evolves 
unitarily according to the dynamical postulate of the theory, and the coarse-grained state, 
which may approach a final stable state. Even those who take a heterodox position by 
claiming the priority of the coarse-grained state regarding objectivity are clear on that such a 
move requires a reformulation of the fundamental dynamical law of statistical mechanics (see, 
e.g., Misra, Prigogine, and Courbage 1979, Nicolis and Prigogine 1989). In other words, 
independently of the particular disagreements about irreversibility, nobody attempts to endow 
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the statistical state and the coarse-grained state with the same interpretation. On the basis of 
the generalized version of the CP, given that in the quantum case the reduced state is also a 
coarse description regarding the fine description, there is no reason to conflate the reduced 
state of the open system with its quantum state. 
As a consequence, both in the classical and in the quantum cases, the system’s state, 
which evolves according to the dynamical postulate of the respective theory, must not be 
confused with a coarse-grained state or a reduced state, which offers a coarse description of 
the system. Once it is accepted that cg  and 
S
r  are not classical-statistical states, it must be 
admitted that ˆ cg  and ˆ
S
r  are not quantum states either. This is particularly relevant for the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, since endowing reduced states with the same 
interpretation as quantum states yields interpretive difficulties, in particular, is an obstacle for 
no-collapse interpretations to explain consecutive measurements (Ardenghi, Lombardi, and 
Narvaja 2012). When the coarse nature of 
S
r  is accepted, the decoherence of the reduced 
state is a phenomenon that proceeds at a coarse level of description, analogously to the case of 
classical irreversibility. In fact, as Roland Omnès (2001, 2002) stresses, decoherence is a case 
of quantum irreversibility. 
In turn, describing decoherence as a coarse-level phenomenon amounts to interpreting it 
as a process that happens to expectation values: the description in terms of reduced state is 
only a shortcut to explain an expectation-value process. More precisely, when considered 
from a fundamental viewpoint, decoherence involves the convergence of the expectation 
value of any observable of the open system to a value that can be computed as if the system 
were closed and in a state represented by a diagonal density operator.  
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ
  
 
S S
r r
SE
S S S
t t
O O O                  (33) 
As Maximilian Schlosshauer claims in his well-known book about decoherence, strictly 
speaking a reduced density operator is only “a calculational tool” for computing expectation 
values (Schlosshauer 2007: 48). For this reason, the author warns us “against a 
misinterpretation of reduced density matrices as describing a proper mixture of states” (2007: 
69). 
This view of decoherence based on the expectation-value perspective contrasts with 
Zurek’s reading of the phenomenon. Zurek embraces a dynamical interpretation, according to 
which decoherence is a process that transforms quantum states, turning pure states into 
mixtures. From the expectation-value perspective, decoherence is a phenomenon that involves 
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reduced states, which are not quantum quantum states but coarse states. An it is precisely the 
parallel with the classical case, brought to light by the quantum-classical structural 
correspondence, that supports this view that clearly distinguishes between quantum state and 
reduced state. 
Summing up, the expectation-value version of the generalized CP backs up an 
interpretation of the phenomenon of decoherence different from the dynamical approach 
implicit in most presentations: since the reduced state is not the quantum state of the open 
system, but a coarse description of the closed composite system, decoherence should not be 
conceived as a phenomenon resulting from the interaction between an open system and its 
environment (see Castagnino, Fortin, and Lombardi 2010a). By contrast, decoherence is a 
coarse process that emerges, under appropriate conditions, from taking into account only the 
evolution of some degrees of freedom of the whole closed system and disregarding the 
remaining degrees of freedom conceived as the environment (see Fortin and Lombardi 2016). 
7.- Conclusions and perspectives 
In this article, we began by recalling the first versions of the CP in old quantum theory, 
showing how the original claim about a link between frequencies and motions in the atom 
gradually turned out to be conceived by physicists as a requirement of the classical limit of 
quantum mechanics. Once the CP and the demand for the classical limit of quantum 
mechanics are distinguished, a principle proposed in the context of the old quantum theory 
seems to have no other relevance to present-day physics than a historical interest. In contrast 
with this view, we claimed that the CP can still be useful to elucidate the relationship between 
the quantum and the classical domains. In order to argue for this position, we recalled Robert 
Batterman’s proposal of appealing to the CP, in its original formulation, as a conceptual 
resource to face the hard problem of defining quantum chaos.  
On the one hand, inspired by Batterman’s strategy, we undertook the task of elucidating 
the concept of decoherence in the light of the CP. Since the core of the meaning of 
decoherence lies in the concept of reduced state, we developed a detailed structural 
correspondence between quantum mechanics and classical statistical mechanics in order to 
elucidate that concept. Such a correspondence made clear that, both in the classical and in the 
quantum cases, the coarse-grained state and the partial-traced state supply coarse 
descriptions, in such a way that they can be obtained as projections of the corresponding “fine 
description”. In turn, this is a manifestation of the fact that the quantum-classical structural 
correspondence holds at the level of expectation values, 
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On the other hand, Pauli’s mechanical extrapolation of the CP led us to formulate a 
generalized CP, concerned with the correspondence between analogous quantum and classical 
concepts and regularities. Therefore, the CP, as the demand for the agreement between 
classical and quantum expectation values, turns out to be a particular case of that generalized 
version of the CP. In this context, decoherence is the phenomenon that allows the CP, under 
this expectation-value form, to be fulfilled. As a consequence, decoherence must be 
understood as a process that occurs at the level of the expectation values; the reduced state 
must be viewed as a calculation tool for computing the expectation values of interest. This 
means that decoherence is a coarse phenomenon resulting from taking into account only the 
evolution of some degrees of freedom of the whole closed system and disregarding the 
remaining degrees of freedom conceived as the environment. In other words, it is a 
phenomenon relative to the observables selected to be studied. This way of understanding 
decoherence, devised under the guide of the CP, is completely different than the dynamical 
reading based on assuming the transformation of pure states in mixtures, typical in the 
writings of the main theorists of environment-induced approach to decoherence. 
This understanding of decoherence offers a simple way out for the difficulties that 
challenge the orthodox environment-induced approach, which are byproducts of interpreting 
reduced states as quantum states (see Castagnino, Laura and Lombardi 2007): 
 The “open-system” problem: If only open systems may decohere, the issue of the 
emergence of classicality in closed systems, in particular, in the universe as a whole, cannot 
even be posed. In Zurek’s words: “the Universe as a whole is still a single entity with no 
‘outside’ environment, and, therefore, any resolution involving its division into systems is 
unacceptable.” (1994: 181). This difficulty has led to the development of non-dissipative 
approaches to decoherence (see, e.g., Bonifacio et al. 2000, Ford and O’Connell 2001, 
Frasca 2003). 
This “open-system” problem vanishes from the new perspective. Now decoherence is no 
longer conceived as the result of the interaction of an open system with its environment. 
When understood as a coarse evolution, as in the case of classical irreversibility, 
decoherence may happen in closed systems regarding certain relevant observables (this 
closed-system view leads to a generalized view of decoherence, see Fortin, Lombardi, and 
Castagnino 2014, Fortin and Lombardi 2016). 
 The “defining-system” problem: The orthodox approach offers no general criterion to place 
the “cut” between system and environment: given the possibility of “internal” 
environments, the partition must be decided case by case, and usually depends on the 
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previous assumption of the observables that will behave classically. In Zurek’s words: “In 
particular, one issue which has been often taken for granted is looming big as a foundation 
of the whole decoherence program. It is the question of what are the ‘systems’ which play 
such a crucial role in all the discussions of the emergent classicality. This issue was raised 
earlier, but the progress to date has been slow at best.” (1998: 22). 
The “defining-system” problem is simply dissolved by the expectation-value view. In fact, 
any coarse description depends on how the relevant information is selected. As a 
consequence, decoherence is relative to the relevant observables selected to be studied 
(Castagnino, Fortin, and Lombardi 2010b, Dugić and Jeknić-Dugić 2012, Lychkovskiy 
2013). In turn, since there is no privileged or essential decomposition of the closed system 
(Harshmann and Wickramasekara 2007a, 2007b, Harshman 2019), there is no need for an 
unequivocal criterion to identify the systems involved in decoherence (for a detailed 
discussion, see Lombardi, Fortin, and Castagnino 2012). 
The interpretation of decoherence as a relative phenomenon can be generalized leading 
to a closed-system view of quantum mechanics, also inspired in the classical-quantum 
correspondence. In the case of classical statistical mechanics, the dynamical postulate the 
Liouville equation is applied to closed systems, which can be also approached from different 
coarse descriptions. Analogously, the only legitimate quantum systems are the unitary 
evolving closed systems, which can be coarsely described in many different ways. This view 
finds a significant affinity with the so called “quantum structure studies”, dealing with the 
different ways in which a quantum system can be decomposed into subsystems (quantum 
structures) (see, e.g., Zanardi 2001, Jeknić-Dugić, Arsenijević, and Dugić 2013). From this 
closed-system perspective, entanglement is also relative to the partition of the closed system 
into parts (Barnum et al. 2003, 2004, Viola and Barnum 2010), and this relativity dissolves 
what John Earman (2014) calls “puzzles about quantum entanglement”, derived from the lack 
of a univocal criterion to decompose a closed quantum system. 
These recent works show that the CP, with no need of being interpreted in terms of a 
quantum-to-classical limit but conceived as a guiding principle regarding the relations 
between the classical and the quantum domains, may continue to offer relevant contributions 
to the understanding of quantum mechanics.  
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